Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is determined to return Japan to “normal” power status. A “normal” state may be crudely defined as one that is responsible for its own security but Abe’s vision also includes a country that is not embarrassed to be patriotic and one that is able to take a meaningful lead on a range of issues both regionally and globally. In terms of policy initiatives this translates into such proposed measures as constitutional reform, patriotic education programmes, and continued application for a seat on the UN Security Council.
Two interconnected themes underscore the kinds of resistance and challenges facing Japan in its quest for “normality”: Japan’s historical legacy and its relationship with the US.
Historical Legacy
Critically, Japan’s imperialist past affects contemporary attempts to enhance the country’s status as a military power both within the country and the region. Japan scholar Thomas Berger has written of Japan’s culture of “anti-militarism” and in an article for International Security, an international relations journal, two other analysts, Katzenstein and Okuwara, echo this in their belief that:
The structure of the Japanese state has made it virtually impossible, short of a domestic political revolution, for an autonomous and powerful military establishment to emerge in Japan.
While recent and impending developments do not contradict such a belief, they perphaps provoke the need for a caveat. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has been gaining capabilities and pushing the borders of the political space in which it has to use them. Despite some reluctance, Japanese involvement in the 1990 Gulf War led to the disintegration of the domestic ‘taboo’ around deploying troops overseas, followed up by the Peace Keeping Operations Act of June 1992 and subsequent deployments throughout the 1990s such as Cambodia (1992-3) and East Timor (1999). After 9-11 the government have found it easier to push through legislation giving Japan a larger role in support of the ‘war on terror’.
Japanese military capabilities are continuously increasing and Jennifer M. Lind’s research puts Japan as the third highest military spender in the world after the U.S. and Russia. She argues that Japan has built “one of the most powerful military forces in the world, with potent offensive and defensive capabilities”. But Shinzo Abe’s upcoming introduction into the Japanese Diet of a bill to reform the constitution will be a new kind of test for Japan’s historical legacy both domestically and in the region.
The ghost of the Japanese empire continues to shape perceptions across Asia. Particularly, China and Korea regularly express concerns about lack of remorse on Japan’s part or over perceived militant revival; in many ways the experience of Japanese colonialism has had a lasting impact on the construction of postwar national identity in both countries. This is manifested in domestic politics prompting public statements targeting prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni shrine or school textbooks. Feelings run deep and show little sign of mellowing. Indeed, given that South Korea did not protest over the 1985 Nakasone visit to Yasukuni (whereas China did) but that both South Korea and China made public objections in 2001, a case can be made to say that the tensions are heightening. Moreover, the premiership of Koizumi left relations with Japan’s closest neighbours in a state of serious disrepair. Such controversies create difficulties for Japan in its attempts to become a ‘normal’ power.
At home, Abe will face opposition not only from the other parties but within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) there are sections, such as that led by Yasuo Fukuda, that show signs of resisting change to Japan’s pacific constitution. Business interests, especially in the Kansai region, also voice concern over the adverse affect any of the proposed changes will have on relations with China. The Japanese public are essentially divided on the issue and the tension in Japanese identity between pacifist and leader has yet to be fully played out. Abe’s hope for success lies in his belief that it is a new Japan that will emerge, not a return to the old one; he has thus attempted to prioritise regional relations in tandem with his proposals for an expanded military role. It is arguably Japan’s tie to the US that will make this uneasy dual approach unsustainable in the long term.
The US-Japan Security Alliance
The San Francisco treaties left Japan entirely dependent on the US for its national security. This prompted the “Yoshida doctrine” named after Japan’s first postwar prime minister that made economic development a priority for recovery. Until the 1970s Japan benefited from US favouritism; with its security guaranteed and the survival of many regional economic structures put in place during the prewar era, Japan was able to confirm its place as the leader of all Asian economies. But relations with the US were never simple and Japan was unable to develop an autonomous foreign policy; on such issues as relations with Beijing and Moscow Japan was constrained to follow US will and the Cold War system. During the 1980s however, the US, struggling with its own domestic problems, began to put forward a view of Japan as defence free-rider and pushed for Tokyo to take a greater role in matters of national security. As many in Japan realized, this made for something of a catch 22 situation. Development of the military’s role would cause regional and domestic tensions, but antagonising Washington to breaking point would be political and economic suicide.
However, certain members of Japanese elite developed a strategy of getting the maximum benefit out of the alliance by maintaining a number two position to the US’ number one, by making that secondary position as strong as possible. In the 1960s Abe’s great uncle Eisaku Sato had apparently bluffed about Japan’s own desire to develop nuclear abilities in order to secure US nuclear protection for Japan. During the 1990s Japan would instead use its enthusiasm to support US policy as a way of increasing its own military and political role in the region, not always in harmony with Washington’s vision. Japan pushed the limits of its number two role. Occasionally this has led to difficulties such as the US blocking the Japanese attempt to set up an Asian Monetary Fund in the wake of the 1998 financial crisis. But since 9-11 the US has found a new ideological camaraderie with the government in Tokyo and gratefully accepted Japan’s help in its ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Koizumi and now Abe seem to be keen for Japan to adopt a similar position to that of the UK in Europe, providing logistical and political support for the Bush administration's foreign policy in return for economic favours and advanced capabilities. But this bargain has a Faustian dimension as the Blair administration has also discovered; Japan’s thickness with the US makes its neighbours suspicious of its aloofness and gives it a reputation for weakly bowing to US demands. With thousands of US troops stationed in Japan, predominantly in Okinawa, Japan is unlikely to be able to avoid entanglement in any conflict over Taiwan or fallout from a downturn of relations with Pyongyang. Ironically such possibilities provide a continuing rationale for the alliance and military development while the possibility that Japan could actually be drawn into conflict makes national security the ultimate stake.
In terms of its political role in Asia the US plays a role in drawing the borders of Japan’s involvement. Takeshi Yuzawa, a Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs has thus remarked that: “any initiative from Japan for establishing robust institutional mechanisms, which might constrain US military activities, would undermine the credibility of its commitment to the bilateral alliance”.
Japan’s Asia?
Historical legacy and its alliance with the US complicate Japan’s regional standing and the kind of role that it can take. With a growing number of regional multilateral institutions and a coming to maturity of organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) there are those who perceive a growing “Asian” self-consciousness creating the possibility for much tighter economic, security and political cooperation. The apparent fading of wartime scars in relations between Japan and other Asian countries also gives reason for a belief in greater cooperative potential. However, the play of domestic politics in China and South Korea should not be underestimated. The Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy rests increasingly on its nationalist credentials. Additionally, fierce competition over energy resources and territorial disputes should not be lost sight of despite a growth of ostensibly harmonious bilateral treaties and agreements. Japan still faces significant opposition from Seoul and Beijing in its quest for a seat on the UN Security Council and a negative reaction to constitutional reform is inevitable.
Abe will need to weigh up issues such as Yasukuni and disputed territories very carefully with his plans for Japan as it seems unlikely that the country will be able to move to the next level of regional leadership without first addressing issues connected to its historical legacy and its position within the US Security Alliance.
